Until recently, it was widely assumed that Western societies would be governed by moderate political parties, committed to liberal democracy, open economies, and multilateral cooperation. The core values respecting free elections, rule of law, human rights, and civil liberties seemed sacrosanct and, despite some major challenges and notable setbacks, elections and democratic values appeared to be spreading to every corner of the world. The overall mood within the beltway started to become gloomier around a decade ago, however, following the failure of stable states to take root in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the persistence of repression after the botched Arab uprisings. Anxiety accelerated rapidly in Europe following the shock of Brexit and then Trump's victory, reenergizing populist hopes. The predominantly sunny end-of-history optimism of the late-1980s and early-1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, turned rapidly into a more pessimistic zeitgeist. Prognostications differ but observers detect worrying signs of a global democratic retreat, so that, in Huntington's classic formulation, the world could face the onset of a third reverse wave of democratization. Democratic Transition and Consolidation, published in 1996 after the tide turned again towards the third wave. In their famous formulation, regime consolidation means that democracy has become 'the only game in town. ' 2 This is thought to depend essentially upon three characteristics.
(i) Culturally, the overwhelming majority of people believe that democracy is the best form of government, so that any further reforms reflect these values and principles.
(ii) Constitutionally, all the major actors and organs of the state reflect democratic norms and practices.
(iii) Behaviorally, no significant groups actively seek to overthrow the regime or secede from the state.
What does evidence suggests about the contemporary state of each of Linz and Stepan's conditions in Western democracies? This essay advances three core claims:
Culturally, we can examine systematic survey data monitoring public attitudes towards democratic ideals and performance. When compared with their parents and grandparents, there is evidence in Anglo-American democracies that Millennials express weaker approval of democratic values, as claimed by Foa and Mounk. 3 But this is not a consistent pattern across two-dozen diverse Western democracies;
elsewhere, in several countries such as Spain and France, there are no significant trends by birth cohort. 4 This pattern may also be a life-cycle rather than a generational effect. When evaluating the performance of how democracy works in their own country, the evidence confirms that deep dissatisfaction persists among critical citizens living in several states in Mediterranean Europe, as long observed in Italy and Greece. 5 This also leads naturally towards the final point: behaviorally, the most serious contemporary threats to
Western liberal democracies arise from twin forces that each, in different ways, seek to undermine the regime: sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security, and the rise of populist-authoritarian forces. The potential dangers of these developments, which feed parasitically off each other, should not be under-estimated. In particular, President Donald Trump's blustering rhetoric, as exemplified by his Inauguration speech, tramples willy-nilly over many standard norms and conventional practices observed in liberal democracies, and it also dismisses America's leadership role in the world as an advocate defending fundamental freedom. Populist leaders like Trump typically benefit from mistrust of 'the establishment' and they seek to further undermine faith in the legitimate role of the media ('enemy of the people'), the independence of the courts ('so-called judges'), and the integrity of elections ('rigged). A spate of new scholarship debates the complex economic and cultural reasons behind support for varieties of populism. 6 But contrary to Foa and Mounk's suggestion, in fact the reverse pattern of generational support for populist-authoritarian parties can be observed; in the United States and in many European countries, voters supporting these parties and leaders are drawn disproportionately from the older generation, not the Millennials. 7 With the steady erosion of human rights and civil liberties, several hybrid regimes in less well-off societies have slid back towards autocracy, including Venezuela, Turkey, Hungary, and the Philippines.
Despite the angry, anti-establishment, pitchfork rhetoric, and the major threats this poses to liberal values, social tolerance, and multilateral cooperation, it remains to be seen how far populistauthoritarian forces will be checked in Western societies by resilient democratic institutions, including the bailiwick of the vigilant news media, independent courts, effective opposition parties, and reenergized civil societies.
Let's unpack the evidence behind each of these arguments. 
I: Cultural trends

Support for democratic values
Culturally, when more systematic survey data is examined across a broader range of more than two- Independent survey evidence from other sources also throws light on these general observations; for example, a recent study of U.S. public opinion by the Pew Research Center found no consistent age differences in American views about the important components of a strong democracy. 16 Thus compared with the oldest (65+) generation of Americans, Millennials attached slightly greater importance to the rights to peaceful protest and to express unpopular views, while they regarded the value of open and fair elections as slightly less important. This probably reflects more generation orientations towards alternative forms of civic engagement. They proved similar to other age groups, however, in their views about the importance of media freedom and the need for checks and balances on executive power.
Democratic performance
We can look more broadly across a wider range of European societies in public evaluations of how well people believe that democracy performs in their own country. impressionable years that continue as they mature in life. Yet there is well-established evidence that age differences in political attitudes and behavior, like voter turnout, are at least partially the product of life-cycle effects, which are grounded in social and psychological experiences that affect all people as they gain in years, such as through going to school and college, entering the paid workforce, settling down in a local community, raising a family, gaining leisure in retirement from the paid workforce, and gradually losing some physical mobility in old age. 18 Life-cycle effects suggest that young people will eventually come to resemble the middle-aged. In addition, period effects arise from specific shared experiences and defining events that stamp an indelible mark on society, such as the shock of 9/11 on perceptions of terrorist threats in the U.S. and the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on Mediterranean European economies.
[ Figure 4 about here]
To examine the evidence from the World Values Survey, Figure 4 shows Table 1 about here]
The net gains and losses for freedom around the globe during the last decade are documented in the map in Figure 6 , Figure 7 comparing regime types, and Some criticize Freedom House data, which may be conservative, but the available evidence for trends until 2012 from equivalent assessments, such as the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem), CIRI, and Polity IV, point in a similar direction. 21 Contemporary developments can be confirmed with greater confidence once data covering the last few years is released from these sources.
III: Threats from terrorism and populist authoritarianism
This also leads towards the final point: behaviorally, the most serious contemporary threats to Western democracies arise from the confluence of twin forces seeking to destabilize democratic regimes, those of terrorism and those associated with populist authoritarianism. 22 The problems of sporadic terrorist acts on Western soil for destabilizing societies are self-evident, with a series of attacks in cities such as London, Berlin, Boston, Ottawa, Paris, Nice, Istanbul, Sydney, and Brussels raising public anxieties, especially where jihadist supporters serve to fuel the flames of Islamophobia. 23 The dangers to public confidence are obvious, especially the apparent incapacity of the security forces to prevent the random mass shootings, bombings, and weaponization of vehicles by home-grown militants holding national citizenship, with no prior association with radical support networks, and with no previous track record of violence. Anxieties are also heightened by the refugee crisis in Europe. Most importantly, like tapeworms, fleas, aphids, fungi, and barnacles, a parasite-host relationship links anxieties over random terrorist acts with growing support for populist-authoritarian parties. The consequences for destabilizing the cultural and constitutional foundations of Western democratic regimes and the global world order continue to play out as events unfold. But there could be serious dangers in the reaction of the Trump administration to whatever will be the next Boston
Marathon or San Bernardino act occurring on American soil, and the security response such an event would be thought to justify. 24 The rise of populist authoritarianism in the Maduro in Venezuela. 28 These cases provide the clearest warning of how populist forces have the capacity to undermine fundamental human rights and freedoms under these types of regimes.
To understand the risks, it helps to see populism as a governing style with three defining features. [ Figure 8 about here]
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